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RE-EVALUATING IRISH ENERGY POLICY IN LIGHT OF BREXIT 
 
* Muireann Á. Lynch1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The result of the UK referendum on EU membership has prompted a re-
evaluation of many Irish policies with a view to ‘Brexit-proofing’ them. The areas 
of energy and climate policy are no different. As things stand, much of Irish 
energy and climate policy is shaped at EU level, and so the UK leaving the EU 
would have implications for Irish policy irrespective of the strong ties between 
the Irish and UK energy systems. Re-evaluation of Irish energy policy in light of 
Brexit is therefore understandable and advisable. However, many issues facing 
Irish, and indeed EU, energy and climate policy are independent of Brexit, and 
should not be neglected in the public debate. This paper briefly examines some of 
these issues, with a particular view as to whether and how the policy context has 
changed in light of Brexit. 
2. IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR ENERGY POLICY  
2.1 Electricity market membership and participation 
One of the main effects of Brexit on energy policy is an increase in uncertainty, 
particularly surrounding the future of energy market structures. An all-island 
single electricity market (SEM) has existed in Ireland since 2007 (Barrett et al., 
2015) and the SEM is part of the wider EU Internal Market for Electricity, as is the 
electricity market in Great Britain (European Commission, 2009). The SEM is 
currently undergoing a significant redesign (Di Cosmo and Lynch, 2016) in order 
to comply with European regulations on electricity market design. At an 
institutional level, the Irish Transmission System Operator participates in the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-
E)2 and the regulators North and South participate in the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (Everis and Mercados, 2010). The SEM 
is underpinned by legislation in Ireland and Northern Ireland that was enacted 
under the framework of the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom (Barrett et al., 2015). Therefore 
its existence should not automatically be called into question as a result of Brexit, 
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although the legislation will have to be revised as it is currently framed in the 
context of the EU Internal Energy Market. Indeed, the UK and Irish governments 
have confirmed that the SEM should be maintained in Brexit negotiations 
(Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017; Irish Government, 2017). 
 
The consequences of any disruption to the SEM would have implications for both 
consumers and producers, particularly in terms of costs. Should Northern Ireland 
cease to participate in the SEM, the market would serve a smaller number of 
consumers, and some economies of scale would be lost. There would be a 
reduction in the number of players in both generation and supply markets, and 
this would lead to a reduction in competition. This reduction in competition 
would impose extra regulatory burdens and could also lead to an increase in 
prices. The Moyle interconnector, which runs from Northern Ireland to Scotland, 
would no longer connect directly to the SEM, bringing further implications for 
efficiency and competition. There could also be increases in the costs of 
integrating variable renewable generation, such as wind generation, as there 
would be more barriers to exporting electricity at times of high wind and 
importing electricity at times of low wind. In general the SEM has been a success 
in increasing efficiency and decreasing costs for consumers (Gorecki, 2013) and so 
the maintenance of the SEM post-Brexit should be a top priority for policymakers. 
It should be noted however that given the strong commitment by Irish, UK and 
EU officials to the maintenance of the SEM the probability of the SEM being 
disrupted or dismantled is low. 
 
It is certainly possible that the electricity market of Great Britain (BETTA) will 
continue to participate in the European electricity market post-Brexit, and this is 
also desirable both from an Irish and a European perspective. Great Britain 
currently has electricity interconnection to France and the Netherlands, as well as 
Ireland, and more interconnection to Norway is planned. The UK therefore has an 
incentive to remain integrated with the EU market in order to use these existing 
and planned interconnectors to their full potential. Electricity trading currently 
takes place between EU and non-EU countries, for example between Russia and 
Finland and the Baltics. Furthermore there are currently two examples of non-EU 
electricity markets that participate in the European electricity market (Pollitt, 
2017) and their experience is instructive. Norway is fully integrated into the EU 
market through its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) and of the 
European Free Trade Area. Switzerland, in contrast, is fully physically integrated 
into the EU market but does not participate fully in the market following the 
failure of the Swiss referendum on freedom of movement in 2014. In particular, 
Swiss energy companies are restricted in their rights to participate in EU energy 
markets, while Norwegian energy companies do not face such a restriction. 
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Neither the Norwegian nor the Swiss regulators are members of ACER3 but both 
their Transmission System Operators participate in ENTSO-E.  
 
Drawing on the Swiss experience, Great Britain’s continued full participation in 
the European electricity market is not guaranteed, especially considering the fact 
that the physical links between the British and European electricity markets are 
much weaker than in the Swiss case. As Great Britain is the only electricity market 
that is physically linked to the SEM there could be implications for the ease with 
which the SEM participates in the EU electricity market should Great Britain cease 
to be a full participant. In particular, without common rules for the trading of 
electricity over interconnectors, there is potential for perverse interconnection 
flows, where electricity flows from the expensive region to the cheaper region, 
rather than the other way around. Ending such perverse flows is a major aim of 
the European electricity market (European Commission, 2009a). Even in the 
absence of tariffs over interconnectors, if the timing of the purchase and sale of 
electricity over interconnectors is not aligned across markets, this can lead to 
suboptimal usage and means the markets will not be properly linked. 
 
It should be noted that the UK is likely to remain a member of both the European 
gas and electricity markets, but not guaranteed. It is however unlikely that the UK 
will remain a member of the electricity market but not the gas market, or vice 
versa. Ireland and the UK are both net energy importers, and so unlike other 
forms of trade, there is a clear common interest in maintaining the status quo – it 
is not a case of there being winners and losers should the UK leave the European 
energy markets. However the UK remaining as part of the European internal 
energy market is not guaranteed and clarity regarding the UK’s future 
participation in European energy markets would be helpful for all parties. In 
particular, the future shape of the UK’s involvement, and whether they are ‘rule 
takers’ or ‘rule makers’, would have implications for Irish energy policy. Should 
the UK fail to remain a member of EU energy markets, World Trade Organisation 
regulations on the trade of energy would apply. 
2.2 Interconnection and market integration 
The degree to which the electricity systems in Ireland and Great Britain are 
physically integrated with each other and with the electricity systems in mainland 
Europe by means of interconnection is important in determining market 
integration (Gorecki, 2013). EirGrid, along with the French TSO RTÉ, is currently 
exploring the possibility of an electricity interconnector between Ireland and 
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France.4 Should BETTA, the electricity market in Great Britain, leave the European 
internal electricity market, this link would provide the only means of Ireland 
having a direct physical link to the EU electricity market and therefore may 
appear as an attractive proposition. The European Council has called for total 
interconnection capacity of 10 per cent of the installed capacity to be present in 
each Member State. All of Ireland’s interconnection is currently to Great Britain 
and so post-Brexit, Ireland’s interconnection to another EU Member State will be 
zero. In spite of this, a new interconnector to France should only proceed if it 
enhances welfare in Ireland and France, as Irish and French consumers will 
ultimately pay for the investment. As a Project of Common Interest, the project 
would qualify for an EU subsidy, and so the entire cost of the project would not 
fall on Irish and French consumers. Welfare can be enhanced by decreasing 
electricity costs and/or prices, but there is also the potential for non-monetary 
benefits, including reduced uncertainty surrounding electricity prices or increased 
security of electricity supply. The impacts of interconnection are difficult to 
accurately quantify and so there should be a clear net benefit before this, or 
indeed any, infrastructural project is approved. If there is no clear net benefit 
Ireland should instead argue for an exemption from any requirement to have a 
given level of interconnection with another EU Member State rather than pursue 
suboptimal interconnection to France or elsewhere. 
 
Ideally, the determining factor when trading electricity over interconnectors 
would be the relative price of electricity5 which would include the carbon price. 
Carbon emissions from the electricity sector are priced as part of the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS). The carbon price arising from the ETS is much 
lower than anticipated and the system arguably requires reform (Cameron and 
Teytelboym, 2017). This low price for carbon provided the impetus for the UK’s 
implementation of a carbon price floor in 2013.6 As a result, electricity generated 
in Great Britain has a different carbon price to electricity generated elsewhere in 
the EU. EU trading rules currently preclude Britain from taxing electricity imports 
according to their carbon content. However, should Great Britain leave the EU 
single market for electricity, they may attempt to impose tariffs on imported 
electricity according to the carbon content of the electricity generated in the 
exporting country. Pollitt (2017) argues that such a strategy may be desirable to 
UK policymakers in order to remove the incentive to invest in interconnection 
between Great Britain and other European countries purely for the purposes of 
taxation arbitrage. At times of high wind, Ireland has exported electricity to Great 
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Britain in order to avoid curtailing7 this electricity. The carbon content of this 
electricity is zero, and so under a regime in which electricity exports to Great 
Britain were taxed according to their carbon content would have a competitive 
advantage compared to electricity generated from fossil fuels in France,8 Belgium 
or the Netherlands. This would lead to higher electricity exports from Ireland 
which could in turn raise prices in Ireland.9 In general, any changes to electricity 
trading undertaken by the UK outside of the IEM have the potential to have 
consequences for Ireland. The particular effects on consumers and generators 
would depend on the particular changes that occur. 
2.3 Renewable energy policy in the UK 
In recent years the environmental impact of energy supply has emerged as a 
specific consideration of energy policy. The UK has been a main driver of EU 
climate policy (Cameron and Teytelboym, 2017) and indeed can be seen to have 
gone beyond the requirements of EU climate policy by implementing a carbon 
price floor in response to the low carbon price emerging from the EU ETS. The 
future of UK climate policy following Brexit is unclear however, particularly given 
the current political climate. In particular, the UK may choose to abandon specific 
targets for renewable energy and may pursue carbon emission reduction through 
other means (Pollitt, 2017), if at all. This would have implications primarily for the 
all-island electricity market if there is a lower level of renewable electricity 
generation in Northern Ireland relative to the Republic. Renewable generation 
depresses wholesale electricity prices and also increases the costs associated with 
accommodating higher levels of renewable electricity. Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi 
Valeri (2017) find that from 2008 to 2012 the reduction in prices was greater than 
the increase in the costs of accommodating the renewable electricity. As the 
amount of renewable electricity increases to 40 per cent of demand and beyond, 
the relative magnitudes of these effects may change. Consumers North and South 
will therefore experience the same net effect of renewable generation on their 
bills, even if the levels of renewable generation in each jurisdiction (and the 
associated subsidies) diverge.  
 
In general, divergence of energy polices between Northern Ireland and Ireland 
could put strains in the SEM and ISEM. It is in part for this reason, for example, 
that the carbon price floor was not implemented in Northern Ireland. 
Policymakers have an incentive to maintain broad agreement between renewable 
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policy in the North and South even if the UK as a whole pursues a different level 
of renewable generation post-Brexit. 
2.4 Security of gas supply 
Much of the discussion regarding the impact of Brexit on energy has focused on 
supply security. This is primarily due to the fact that Ireland is heavily dependent 
on gas supplies via Great Britain. While the Corrib field met 55 per cent of 
demand in its first year of operation, the Moffat link with Great Britain is 
expected to be re-established as the dominant gas supply point from as early as 
2018 onwards (Gas Networks Ireland, 2016). Great Britain has a more diversified 
gas supply, sourcing gas through imports via Norway, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, as well as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports (mainly from 
Qatar).10 Gas is an important fuel in Ireland both for heating and for electricity 
generation, and has the advantage of being relatively low in carbon emissions. 
Ireland currently has three sources of gas supply; a gas pipeline from Moffat in 
Scotland, the Kinsale field and the Corrib gas field, although the contribution from 
Kinsale is almost negligible at this stage (Gas Networks Ireland, 2016). Corrib and 
Kinsale are not in a position to meet all of Ireland’s annual gas demand and so 
Ireland will continue to rely on gas via Great Britain for the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, Kinsale is expected to cease production by 2020/2021 while Corrib 
production is projected to decrease to 50 per cent of its initial levels by 2025.  
 
EU regulations currently prevent individual Member States interrupting energy 
supplies to other Member States should an energy crisis emerge (European 
Commission, 2010) and new stronger regulations are currently in preparation 
(European Commission, 2016). The new regulations include details concerning 
the technical calculation of gas supply security both at national and regional level. 
In an EU context, Ireland and the UK are considered to be one region for the 
purposes of gas security. Negotiations surrounding the new stronger regulations 
are ongoing and the regulations themselves are subject to change. However, in 
their current form, Ireland may thus find itself as an isolated energy ‘region’ 
within the EU post-Brexit11 and may therefore require exemptions from some EU 
regulations concerning security of energy supply at regional level.  
 
Ireland and the UK have separate intergovernmental agreements from 1993 and 
2003 on sharing gas supplies which may remain in place even if the UK is no 
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EU gas market. Neither Switzerland nor Norway forms part of any of the EU regions with respect to gas markets, and 
their gas TSOs are observers rather than full members of ENTSO-G. Thus if Great Britain were to remain a fully 
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longer subject to EU requirements on energy supplies.12,13 These agreements, 
coupled with the fact that it is impossible to cut supply to the Republic of Ireland 
without simultaneously cutting supply to Northern Ireland, may temper fears of 
supply interruptions in the unlikely event of an energy emergency. The impact of 
Brexit on the probability of gas supply interruptions is therefore probably small 
but is not non-existent and so the context for policy decisions relating to energy 
security can be said to have changed slightly due to Brexit. 
 
The possibility of importing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is an obvious means of 
diversifying gas supply. LNG has an advantage over new pipelines as the gas can 
be imported in liquid form from many different gas markets worldwide. The LNG 
project in County Kerry has planning permission but currently is not being 
developed (Gas Networks Ireland, 2016). A Floating Storage and Regasification 
Unit (FSRU)14 is an alternative means of importing LNG. Increased gas imports 
from LNG also allow for the possibility of exporting gas to Great Britain should it 
prove profitable to do so. 
 
Investing in more gas storage is another measure that can be taken to increase 
the security of energy supplies in Ireland. A cheaper alternative to gas storage is 
increasing storage of distillate. Gas fired power plants can be run on distillate, 
and so increased distillate storage would reduce the probability of electricity 
shortages should there be an interruption to gas supplies. EU regulations 
currently require Member States to store 90 days’ worth of average daily 
imports, or 61 days of oil consumption, within the EU to mitigate against supply 
uncertainty (European Commission, 2009). Ireland currently stores part of its 
required oil allocation in the UK. Post-Brexit these stores will obviously no longer 
be situated within the EU and so Ireland may require an exemption from this 
Directive. Finally the possibility of increased domestic production of gas would 
also obviously enhance the security of Ireland’s energy supply.  
 
The impacts of any such measures to enhance security of supply on the domestic 
gas market, and the consequent net benefit, are unknown, and research in this 
area should be prioritised. A project such as an LNG terminal would be privately 
owned infrastructure and so the investment decision is a commercial one. On the 
other hand, requirements regarding distillate back-up in order to generate 
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13  www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/treatyseries/uploads/documents/legaldivisiondocuments/treatyseries 
2007/no-19-of-2007.pdf. 
14  A FRSU is a special type of ship that can both transit and regasify LNG. Importing gas via this emerging technology 
does not require an onshore regasification unit, in contrast to the proposed LNG facility in County Kerry. 
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electricity can be imposed on generation firms by the regulatory authorities. In 
general, significant infrastructural investment decisions of any type should be 
justified on the basis of a thorough cost-benefit analysis and should not be taken 
on the basis of the (real or perceived) threats of Brexit. 
3. FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ENERGY POLICY IN IRELAND 
The above is a summary of the areas of energy policy that may be impacted by 
Brexit. In addition, however, it is prudent to re-evaluate energy policy in general 
at regular intervals, particularly as new research sheds light on energy policy 
objectives and outcomes. In this spirit, the remainder of this paper outlines the 
main areas of concern surrounding energy policy that are largely unchanged as a 
result of the Brexit vote, but which are no less important. 
3.1 Techno-economic rationale of energy policy 
In order to minimise energy costs, it is imperative that Ireland’s energy policy 
strategies are informed by sound techno-economic analysis. To date, much of 
Irish energy policy has focused on a mix of objectives, including cost reduction, 
energy poverty considerations, supply security, emissions reduction, efficiency 
targets, renewable targets, research and development goals and job creation and 
retention (see for example DCENR, 2015). This mix of objectives leads to overly-
costly energy policy, except of course in the case where the differentiated 
objectives and targets perfectly align with those that would arise under the least-
cost policy pathway. Once the objectives of energy policy have been determined, 
the optimal pathway to meeting those objectives, taking into account the 
preferences and priorities of the Irish people, should be identified and pursued. 
 
Some of the inconsistencies and extra costs of Irish energy policy, such as dividing 
carbon emissions between the ETS sector and the non-ETS sector, have their 
roots in EU regulations. The EU has been to the forefront in combating carbon 
emissions but has done so through a mix of targets for carbon reduction, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy (European Commission, 2009b), all to be 
achieved by the year 2020. Within the renewable energy sector there are also 
differentiated national targets for total renewable energy along with a separate 
target for renewable energy in transport. The EU is shaping future energy policy 
for 2030 and beyond15 as part of the Clean Energy Package.16 The package is 
subject to ongoing negotiation. Current proposals involve an overall EU target of 
27 per cent of total energy to be met by renewable energy, but no differentiated 
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national renewable energy targets or specific targets for the transport sector as 
there were for 2020. 
 
Given an emissions reduction target, there is no strong economic argument for 
differentiated targets for renewable generation or energy efficiency (Böhringer et 
al., 2009), nor is there a strong argument for differentiated national targets (Aune 
et al., 2012). From an economic efficiency point of view, the change in European 
policy from differentiated national renewable targets therefore represents an 
improvement on the 2020 targets. The challenge for Irish policymakers is now to 
design the optimal set of policies to meet the objectives of the Clean Energy 
Package. There is an argument for resisting the temptation to include new 
renewable energy targets in domestic policy, and instead to show a firm 
commitment to a technology-neutral carbon reduction target. Determining the 
optimal pathway to a particular carbon reduction target will bring about gains for 
consumers both in terms of cost and transparency. The costs of failing to meet EU 
targets would ideally be included in any cost-benefit analysis.17 However these 
costs are currently unknown, which presents a further challenge for energy 
policy. 
 
Furthermore, as a result of EU policy, carbon emissions are treated differently 
depending on whether they originate in the ETS sector or the non-ETS sector.18 
This is suboptimal as the effect of carbon emissions on the environment is the 
same regardless of their origin. Another problem associated with ETS design is 
that it taxes the production, but not the consumption, of carbon emissions. There 
is thus an incentive to consume carbon-heavy goods produced in countries that 
do not tax carbon to the same degree as the EU, known as carbon leakage (Kuik 
and Hofkes, 2010). On a related note, for example, Curtis et al. (2013) found that 
a carbon price floor in the UK decreased carbon emissions from the UK but 
increased carbon emissions elsewhere.  
 
While many of these design flaws with the EU ETS have been acknowledged, 
unless there is a strong shift in policy at EU level, Irish policymakers will have to 
design energy policy within the limitations of the EU policy regime. In particular, 
there may be an economic argument for requiring separate regulation and/or 
subsidisation policies for the ETS sector. Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri (2017) 
show how renewable electricity from 2008-2012 simultaneously delivered a 
lower electricity price and lower emissions, in spite of the weak ETS price. Lynch 
and Curtis (2016) show that wind generation has a value in its ability to reduce 
 
                                                          
 
17  Ireland is currently one of the few EU countries projected to miss the 2020 target for total renewable energy, see 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0057&qid=1488449105433&from=EN. 
18  See ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
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the probability of very high price spikes and increasing certainty around energy 
prices, apart from any price-reduction contribution. In the absence of a strong 
ETS price signal, separate subsidisation programmes for renewable generation 
may therefore be a second-best policy. However any such subsidy scheme should 
still follow the principles of least cost and technology neutrality, for example by 
determining subsidisation levels for renewable electricity through a technology-
neutral auction process. The optimal level of renewable energy in Ireland, in all 
three energy sectors, is still unknown and research in this area should be 
prioritised in order to inform policy. 
 
At present the 2020 target for renewable electricity, at 40 per cent, is much 
higher than the targets for the heating and transport sectors, at 12 per cent and 
10 per cent respectively.19 There are several arguments for shifting the Irish focus 
from the electricity sector towards the heating and transport sectors. The first 
argument is the relative size of the sectors – the electricity sector accounts for 
just under 20 per cent of total final energy demand,20 and so the current target of 
meeting 40 per cent of electricity demand with renewable generation equates to 
meeting just under 8 per cent of total energy demand with renewables. Secondly, 
the benefits of each additional unit of renewable energy in each sector, both in 
terms of costs and emissions, are likely to reduce as the total amount of 
renewable energy increases.21 The costs associated with the integration of ever 
higher amounts of renewable electricity will also increase. There are concerns 
about social acceptability of renewable electricity generation also (see Bertsch et 
al., 2016 and Hyland and Bertsch, 2017). The public desire for higher levels of 
renewable electricity should be compared with the acceptance of renewable 
technologies in the heating and transport sectors, as well as the acceptance of 
other carbon-reducing technologies, and should form part of the analysis 
informing energy policy post-2020. Thirdly, reducing carbon emissions in the ETS 
sector in Ireland will not reduce total European emissions, but instead shifts 
those emissions to another European Member State.22 Emission reductions in the 
non-ETS sector, however, result in a global decrease in emissions. Finally, there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding future ETS prices, which means low carbon 
investments in the ETS sector face a risk premium. Strong government 
commitment to the principle, if not the level, of carbon taxation in the non-ETS 
sector means there is more certainty around the future cost of carbon and so 
there is less risk associated with investing in low carbon technologies.23 This 
 
                                                          
 
19  These targets were set as part of the National Renewable Energy Action Plan, see www.dccae.gov.ie/en-
ie/energy/topics/Renewable-Energy/irelands-national-renewable-energy-action-plan-(nreap)/Pages/Action-
Plan.aspx. 
20  www.seai.ie/Publications/Statistics_Publications/Energy_in_Ireland/Energy-in-Ireland-1990-2015.pdf. 
21  This is a standard Diminishing Marginal Returns argument. 
22  This is known as the waterbed argument, see for example papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2654641. 
23  See for example Walsh et al. (2014) for a demonstration of how a carbon taxation regime would incentivise 
investment in CCS technology while a carbon price scheme would not. 
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means that carbon-reduction technologies in the heating and transport sectors 
would have less uncertainty surrounding their future profitability compared to 
technologies in the electricity sector. In the heating sector, for example, certainty 
surrounding a higher carbon price going forward would lead to an increased 
incentive to switch from coal and peat to gas, or would provide an incentive to 
invest in insulation in order to reduce energy bills. 
 
In summary, future energy policies, beyond the 2020 targets, should take into 
consideration the true impact on global carbon emissions, rather than focusing 
solely on meeting EU mandated targets for emissions reduction and/or 
renewable energy production. These policies should be informed by robust 
analysis, which includes not only the cost of the policies but also the risks 
associated with them. 
3.2 Security of supply 
Similar to the case of environmental policy, some of the main policy questions in 
the area of supply security are actually unlikely to be impacted either way by 
Brexit. The first is the optimal level of interconnection (independent of which 
markets Ireland interconnects with), either for gas or electricity. New gas 
interconnection to Great Britain would have a positive impact on the security of 
supply for both gas and electricity, as the probability of an electricity shortage 
arising from a gas shortage would be reduced. New electricity interconnection 
would have a positive impact on the security of supply for electricity but any 
impact on gas security would be very small. However electricity interconnection 
can have a greater diversification effect, as the electricity supply is supplemented 
by the entire electricity generation fleet of the neighbouring system, which 
includes generation from multiple fuel types, while a gas interconnector connects 
to one fuel only (albeit a fuel that may have multiple supply sources, e.g. 
indigenous supply, pipeline supply, LNG, etc.). Furthermore, new electricity 
interconnection to France is possible, bringing with it the benefits of 
diversification by interconnecting to a new market. New gas interconnection 
would most likely only supplement the existing interconnection with Great 
Britain. Finally the tariffs for flows over interconnectors would have to be well-
designed by the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) as the flows over gas 
interconnectors have implications for flows over electricity interconnectors and 
vice versa. There are also considerations regarding competition and market 
power. A robust examination of the strategic choice between gas and electricity 
interconnection should be conducted in order to inform sound policy. This 
examination should take account of the interaction of the tariffs on gas and 
electricity interconnectors, as well as any alternative measures that can be taken 
to enhance energy security, such as those outlined in the discussion on gas 
security above. 
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Within the Irish electricity market, new interconnection is required between 
North and South in order to ensure security of electricity supply in Northern 
Ireland from 2021. The System Operator of Northern Ireland (SONI) has gone so 
far as to state that they cannot be confident they can ‘keep the lights on’ past 
2021 without the North-South interconnector (House of Commons Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee, 2017). The interconnector is estimated to reduce costs 
in the SEM by €30 million per year and wholesale electricity prices by 0.9 per cent 
(Curtis et al., 2013). These financial benefits would accrue to consumers on the 
whole island. 
 
Finally the policy of running the three peat stations at maximum capacity, 
regardless of whether it is economic to do so, is justified by means of a security of 
supply argument (Tuohy et al., 2009). Consumers cover the extra costs of this 
policy through a Public Service Obligation levy included on their bills24 and this 
levy is recalculated every year (see for example CER, 2016). This policy, which is 
due to expire in 2020, has led to overly expensive carbon-heavy electricity 
generation. The PSO levy is applied to all consumers’ bills regardless of electricity 
consumption or of ability to pay and so is a regressive policy (Farrell and Lyons, 
2015). In an effort to reduce carbon emissions from the peat stations, a policy 
decision to co-fire the stations with 30 per cent biomass was made. However this 
policy is also far more expensive than alternative generation options (O’Mahoney 
et al., 2013). 
 
The policy of prioritising high-cost electricity generation from peat has been 
questioned from as far back as 1992 (Nic Giolla Choille, 1992). Regional benefits 
including employment in the Midlands have featured as arguments for 
maintaining the policy, although the actual justification is based on a security of 
supply argument. The existence of the peat stations is sufficient to contribute to 
security of supply and there is no added security benefit from running the 
stations at maximum capacity. Reversing this policy, which would bring about 
benefits for Irish consumers (Tuohy et al., 2009) regardless of Brexit, would aid 
the cost and environmental arms of energy policy with no consequence for 
security. While the policy has all but run its course, it serves as a reminder of the 
potential for various arms of energy policy (affordability, sustainability and 
security of supply) to conflict, as well as the danger of including supplementary 
objectives (such as regional employment) in energy policy. 
 
                                                          
 
24  The PSO levy also covers the costs of various electricity support schemes such as renewable energy and, until 
recently, gas plants deemed necessary for security of supply. 
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3.3 Competition in electricity markets 
The level of competition, both in wholesale and retail markets, is a very 
important driver of electricity prices. The level of wholesale competition is 
influenced to some degree by the amount of interconnection with other 
countries. Given the move to the new electricity market design, competition is 
even more important to ensure competitive wholesale prices (Di Cosmo and 
Lynch, 2016). Fully integrating our energy market with EU markets may be a draw 
for more players and therefore more competition in energy retail markets. 
However energy markets are highly unlikely to reach perfectly competitive levels 
on their own (Oderinwale and van der Weijde, 2016) and so there will always 
need to be robust regulation in place to protect the consumer. To date, analysis 
of competition in the retail sector has included the level of switching between 
energy supply companies (see for example CER, 2017). While consumers 
switching supplier can aid competition, it is not a definitive measure of 
competition, not least because it does not account for the possibility that the 
same consumers regularly switch suppliers, while being cross-subsidised by 
consumers who remain with one supplier. More robust analysis of the level of 
competition in Irish energy markets should be prioritised in order to protect 
consumers. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The consequences of Brexit for the energy sector, particularly in the area of 
security of supply, should certainly inform Irish energy policy in the short and 
medium term. However, this should not be to the neglect of other salient issues. 
In summary, when it comes to energy and climate policy, policymakers should 
focus on the key issues (competitiveness, carbon pricing and taxation and 
infrastructure) rather than concentrating to an excessive degree on issues arising 
from Brexit, which may prove peripheral in determining the degree to which the 
energy sector impacts on the welfare of the Irish people. 
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